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Whistleblowing, Virtue, and Accountability 
in an Age of Precarious Employment
Justin Oakley and Leanne White
Introduction
In recent decades there has been a strikingly large increase in 
the proportion of the workforce employed in casual positions, 
compared with their more securely-employed colleagues. 
Australia has been at the forefront of moves towards 
casualisation, and there has been much discussion here about 
the impact that being employed more precariously may have 
on the lives of current employees and on those looking for 
work.2 In this paper, we consider some broader implications 
of casualisation for the community overall. We focus on 
whistleblowing as one important way of keeping organisations 
accountable to the community. We examine whether 
casualisation plausibly leads to a decrease in whistleblowing, 
and so whether this employment trend undermines 
organisational accountability by discouraging whistleblowing. 
The paper also briefly considers the significance for the 
community if it is thereby deprived of the virtuous behaviour 
commonly exhibited by whistleblowers.
The actions of whistleblowers in exposing corruption are 
an important means of maintaining the accountability of 
organisations to the broader community. While there are 
various institutional mechanisms designed to keep both public 
and private organisations accountable to us, whistleblowers’ 
inside knowledge of an organisation enables them to identify 
and draw attention to organisational wrongdoing that other 
mechanisms may fail to pick up. Disclosures by high-profile 
public sector whistleblowers have prompted governments 
to set up inquiries or royal commissions, which often report 
problems with the culture of an organisation, and the closing 
of ranks around those accused of wrongdoing. A common 
consequence of these findings is a loss of public confidence in 
the organisations concerned and, sometimes, in the profession 
to which the wrongdoer belongs.3 Indeed, many organisations, 
both public and private, have expressed concern about 
declining levels of public trust in them. If casualisation does 
undermine organisational accountability by discouraging the 
reporting of corrupt behaviour by those who observe it, that 
would raise new concerns about this employment trend – 
particularly in a country such as Australia, where casualisation 
is especially high, and where the reporting of corruption may 
already be somewhat inhibited by what some whistleblowers 
call a ‘culture of mateship’.
In our discussion we use the term ‘whistleblowing’ to refer to 
an employee’s disclosure of unethical behaviour by a member 
of their organisation, to someone (internal or external to the 
organisation) who is able to take steps to intervene. The term 
whistleblowing (sometimes called public interest disclosure or 
ethical informing) is widely used in Australia and internationally. 
Unlike some, we do not stipulate that whistleblowing only 
counts as such if done from a particular motivation, such 
as altruism (rather than, say, resentment). We leave this 
question fairly open, partly because the empirical studies of 
whistleblowing we discuss do not rule out disclosures prompted 
by, for example, resentment of a superior, as genuine instances 
of whistleblowing. Nevertheless, our later comments about 
whistleblowing as virtuous behaviour are confined to acts of 
whistleblowing prompted by morally admirable motives, such 
as altruism or a sense of professional responsibility. We want 
to demonstrate that in deterring would-be whistleblowers, 
casualisation seems to undermine in an important way 
the accountability of organisations to the community. We 
also argue that in creating a further situational obstacle to 
employees reporting workplace corruption, casualisation 
deprives the community of significant acts of virtue which 
enrich us all and strengthen community bonds.
As William De Maria argues, whistleblowing is a passionate 
topic that ‘deserves a passionate analysis’ (1999, p. xiii). 
Whistleblowers are regarded by some as heroes, others regard 
them as idealists, some view whistleblowers as calculating 
and defensive, and whistleblowers can be considered as the 
vengeful employee (Lewis, 2001, p. 5).
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Whistleblowing Research and Casualisation
In this section we consider what sort of impact the 
casualisation of the workforce might have on whistleblowing. 
It might seem, before looking at the relevant empirical 
studies, both that casualisation could plausibly be thought 
to increase whistleblowing, and that casualisation could 
plausibly be thought to produce a decrease in whistleblowing 
(supposing, in each case, that the extent of organisational 
corruption remained constant). Casualisation might increase 
whistleblowing, as casuals may feel that they have little to 
lose by reporting corrupt behaviour, if they are not hoping to 
remain with the organisation anyway. However, casualisation 
could lead to a decrease in whistleblowing, as casuals might 
feel reluctant to jeopardise their chances of being retained. So, 
what can empirical studies of whistleblowing tell us about this 
question?
Although no empirical studies of whistleblowing seem to 
examine the impact of casualisation as such, it is reasonable 
to infer from the available major studies that casualisation 
most likely leads to a decrease in whistleblowing. Casual 
status seems to be one of several disincentives to reporting 
colleagues’ wrongdoing. Indeed, the evidence suggests that 
casual status, or at least, the nature of the employment 
relationship more generally, may be one of the most important 
factors in determining whether an employee blows the whistle. 
A consistent finding in empirical studies of whistleblowing is 
that those in an insecure employment relationship are less 
likely to whistleblow than are those who have more secure 
employment (see eg. Miceli & Near 1984, 1985; Miethe 1999)
Thus, consider what features were found to characterise 
employees who do not report wrongdoing by colleagues. In 
a pioneering quantitative study of whistleblowing, Marcia 
Miceli and Janet Near (1984) analysed responses by 3,614 US 
public sector employees to a survey asking about employees’ 
reactions to unethical behaviour by colleagues, such as 
stealing state funds or property, accepting bribes, unfairly 
favouring certain contractors, or tolerating a practice that 
endangers public health or safety. They found that these 
‘inactive observers’ are 
likely to be young, high potential, low seniority 
employees...‘fast trackers’... Because their employers 
could easily replace them, their relative power in the 
situation was quite low… [and] they may not have 
wished to jeopardise their good but fragile reputations 
or begin again to gain favor in other organisations 
(Miceli & Near 1984, pp. 699-700). 
 Similar features were found to characterise inactive observers 
in a major study of whistleblowing in the private sector. That 
is, Miceli, Near & Schwenk (1991) studied 653 Directors of 
Internal Auditing employed in the private sector, and found 
that ‘Persons who observe wrongdoing do not report it when…
they earn somewhat lower salaries than persons who report 
wrongdoing’ (pp. 125-6). Inactive observers ‘are…not highly 
committed to their organizations’ (p. 128), and ‘had lower 
salary levels’ (p. 123).
By contrast, the characteristics and situation of employees 
who do or would report colleagues’ unethical behaviour 
differed markedly from those of inactive observers. Miceli and 
Near’s large (1984) study of US public sector employees found 
that whistleblowers tend to have higher levels of pay, seniority, 
and education than do inactive observers (p. 698). In a 
subsequent study, these researchers found that whistleblowers 
typically have more years of service, and higher levels of 
professional status than do inactive observers (Miceli & Near 
1988, pp. 275-6): ‘These findings suggest that employees 
who feel relatively powerful or respected will be more likely 
to report perceived wrongdoing’ (Miceli & Near 1988, pp. 
278). Similarly, in his recent book-length survey of empirical 
research on whistleblowing, Terance Miethe (1999) found 
that workers employed for over 5 years and in supervisory 
positions are more likely to report observed wrongdoing. As 
Miceli and Near (1985, p. 11) put it, ‘Whistleblowers are likely 
to be less dependent on their employers, relative to other 
employees’. In other words, we can expect ‘whistleblowing to 
occur with greater frequency when employment alternatives 
are perceived to be available and acceptable than when they 
are not’ (Miceli and Near 1985, p. 9).
What explanations might be offered for these findings? Miceli 
& Near (1988) suggest that ‘newcomers may be reluctant to 
acquire reputations as “complainers”, or they may be less sure 
that what they have witnessed is considered wrongdoing by the 
organization’(p. 279). These researchers also hypothesise that 
those in more senior (and so less likely to be casual) positions 
may have a greater opportunity to observe wrongdoing (and 
perhaps especially, more serious wrongdoing). Thus, casuals 
might not see as much wrongdoing in the first place as may 
non-casuals, such as employees in continuing positions. 
Another plausible explanation for these findings is that, far from 
feeling they have little to lose, many casuals may be working in 
positions which they hope will become more permanent, and 
so have an added major disincentive to appear ‘troublesome’ 
by reporting on a corrupt colleague. Further, even if negative 
personal consequences were unlikely (where, for instance, an 
employee whistleblows anonymously), people who work as 
casuals may feel less involved in the organisation in the first 
place, and so may (other things being equal) be less likely to 
be prompted to blow the whistle by any sense of complicity at 
failing to prevent avoidable harms perpetrated by a colleague. 
(We discuss this notion of complicity in more detail later.)
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Australian Whistleblowing Studies
We know of no Australian studies that investigate whether there 
is a relationship between casualisation and whistleblowing. 
An extensive study of whistleblowers in Queensland found 
that whistleblowers are ‘mostly model employees’ who are 
‘extremely conscientious’ and ‘highly valued employees’ in 
their organisation. ‘They are invariably educated, experienced, 
efficient, hardworking, honest and perceptive of how their 
organisation functions’ (Commonwealth of Australia 1994, 
p. 62). The study also found that despite the ‘overwhelming 
personal costs’, paradoxically, these people of high moral fibre 
would do it all again (Commonwealth of Australia 1994, p. 
65). But despite the apparent absence here of any large-scale 
quantitative studies comparable to those in the US, there is 
much anecdotal information about Australian whistleblowers, 
who exhibit characteristics which are consistent with the 
findings of the US studies mentioned above. Jean Lennane, 
President of Whistleblowers Australia (a national network 
of whistleblowers and their supporters), explains that, 
‘whistleblowers are usually above average employees – until 
they blow the whistle’ (2000, p. 5). In the same lecture she later 
states, ‘…the majority of whistleblowers these days are very 
conventional people. They’re not dissenters by nature….I have 
been a little concerned over the last year or so that we are 
almost respectable and people are wanting to talk to us, which 
certainly wasn’t the case a few years ago. This is both good 
and bad’ (2000, p. 9). Lennane believes that whistleblowers 
are starting to be viewed as ‘worthy people rather than 
ratbags and trouble-makers’. She adds that it is now possible 
for people to ‘keep their jobs’ but says that ‘you need a lot of 
support’ (2000, p. 12). A number of studies in Australia and 
the US have also found that in the overwhelming majority of 
cases, the whistleblower chooses to make the concern known 
internally to the correct authority and through proper channels, 
before going outside the organisation (Dawson 2000, p. 3).
These points are illustrated well by a recent high-profile case. 
In 2003, Andrew Wilkie, a Senior Transnational Issues Analyst 
who worked for the Office of National Assessments resigned 
in protest over the Australian governments handling of the war 
in Iraq – particularly over the spin about supposed weapons of 
mass destruction. In his story of the decision to betray his long-
standing employer, the Australian government, he explains:
Blowing the whistle on your government isn’t for 
everyone. It can turn your life upside-down, especially 
if you were a senior intelligence officer. But it can also 
leave you remarkably at peace, especially if you’re sure 
of your concerns and self-confident enough to ride the 
roller-coaster that inevitably ensues.
(Wilkie 2004, p. 186). 
One quantitative study of whistleblowing in Australia worthy 
of note was undertaken in 2004 by professional services 
consultant Ernst and Young’s Compliance Advisory Practice 
division in association with the Australian Compliance 
Institute (Ernst and Young, 2004). The study was a cross-
industry examination of whistleblowing policies in Australia, 
based on 132 respondents with varying levels of seniority in a 
variety of Australian workplaces. Some of the key findings were 
as follows: 77% of respondents that worked for organisations 
with whistleblowing policies believed that management 
understood the real cost of unethical behaviour; 80% of 
respondents also believed that staff would be more inclined 
to notify management of wrongdoings if their report could 
be provided anonymously; yet on the subject of anonymity, 
a significant 43% of respondents from organisations which 
had implemented whistleblowing policies felt that the promise 
of anonymity could not be relied upon. This study indicates 
some scepticism amongst Australian employees about the 
effectiveness of whistleblowing policies and procedures.
Two further factors suggest that organisational accountability 
is particularly at risk from casualisation in Australia. First, 
Australia has a relatively high rate of casualisation. Second, 
many Australian whistleblowers have described a culture of 
‘mateship’ as pervading their organisations, where the act 
of ‘dobbing on a mate’ may also be regarded by some as 
‘unAustralian’. Kim Sawyer argues that, ‘in Australia, tightly 
controlled networks dominate. Mateship, not merit, is often 
the determinant of acceptability. By blowing the whistle, the 
whistleblower ceases to be a mate’ (2004, p. 15). 
Casualisation and Whistleblowing in Higher 
Education
Our argument can also be illustrated in the case of higher 
education. There has been a gradual casualisation of a 
significant proportion of academic positions in higher 
education, and this could be seen to threaten the accountability 
of universities through deterring whistleblowing by academics. 
In the United Kingdom, the Dearing Report (1997) warned 
of the ‘shrinking of the core of permanent academic staff 
in universities’ and the ‘concomitant dangers to freedom of 
speech. For those who are on short-term contracts cannot 
easily risk speaking out when what they have to say may 
fall on unwelcoming ears in their institutions’ (Evans 1999, p. 
117). Evans concludes that in the UK Higher Education system 
at least, it is those with either ‘nothing to lose’ or those with 
a conscience, who decide to blow the whistle; and that ‘a 
whistleblower is [regarded as] dangerous because he cannot 
easily be “bought off”’ (1999, p. 118). 
While there have been some prominent cases that attracted 
media attention,4 there do not appear to be any large scale 
studies in Australia that examine the issue of whistleblowing 
in relation to job security. Brian Martin, who has produced 
a number of publications examining case studies of 
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whistleblowers, acknowledges the popular argument that 
tenure provides a necessary basis for academic freedom. 
However, he also recognises that the argument which runs 
counter to this is that academics have diligently learnt not to 
be speak out by the time they finally achieve the often long-
awaited status of a continuing position (Martin 2002, p. 8). 
It is true that Australian universities have recently started 
to implement policies relating to the public disclosure of 
information by staff that is deemed to be in the public interest. 
However while it might be good in theory for universities to 
have whistleblowing and whistleblower protection policies, 
staff who are not convinced that their privacy and rights will 
be protected and respected, or who feel the University may 
not take their concerns seriously, may be inclined to leak 
damaging information outside the organisation. The stories of 
whistleblowers in Australia’s higher education system make for 
interesting (and sometimes depressing) reading.
As at April 2005, of all Australian universities, only two—
Monash University and Victoria University—mentioned 
whistleblower policies on the front page of their websites. 
Possible explanations as to why these two universities have 
chosen to link whistleblower information to the front page 
of their websites can only be determined by speaking to the 
individuals who contributed to this process. Certainly, Monash 
University was the subject of significant media coverage 
in 2002 when Vice-Chancellor Professor David Robinson 
resigned from the position following allegations of plagiarism. 
The Robinson case came to light after a concerned academic 
blew the whistle internally. Victoria University was also the 
subject of media coverage in 2004 when it was revealed that 
ongoing cases of internal financial deception over a period of 
many years had resulted in around $30 million worth of fraud. 
The fraud fiasco was also brought to light by a whistleblower. 
While there is certainly a strong case for all universities in 
Australia to make prominent the link to their whistleblowing 
policies if they are going to be seen to be taking this issue 
seriously, perhaps these two institutions are more aware than 
some of their role as responsible corporate citizens due to the 
attention these cases attracted.
Although searching for the correct information on university 
websites might not always lead to an accurate assessment, 
currently it appears that less than half of Australia’s 
universities have put in place formal protection for those 
who decide to come forward and blow the whistle. Possibly 
the most helpful example of the explanation of the sometimes 
complex whistleblower policies and procedures has been put 
in place by the University of Western Sydney where the process 
is explained with a useful flowchart. 
Character and Situational Factors in 
Whistleblowing
We have argued that, by introducing an additional significant 
deterrent to the reporting of unethical behaviour, casualisation 
seems to undermine in an important way the accountability of 
organisations to the community. What steps could be taken 
to meet this concern? Should one focus on the character of 
casual employees failing to report corrupt behaviour, or should 
one concentrate on the situational barriers to the reporting 
of such behaviour? An important body of research in social 
psychology provides substantial evidence that the variations in 
behaviour displayed by different individuals in a given context 
are often better explained by minor situational variations than 
by the assumptions we commonly make about differences in 
character-traits between those individuals. Summarising this 
research, John Doris comments that ‘Circumstance…often has 
an extraordinary influence on what people do, whatever sort 
of character they may appear to have’ (2002, p. i). A key focus 
of this research has been the influences on beneficent actions, 
or helping behaviour, although (somewhat surprisingly) 
whistleblowing as a type of helping behaviour does not appear 
to have been the subject of much experimental study by social 
psychologists interested in the relative influence of character 
and situation on helping behaviour.
The very existence of whistleblowers could be taken as 
indicating that character is a powerful determinant of helping 
actions in that context, as the actions of whistleblowers suggest 
that at least some people have very robust characters in this 
context, and will expose corrupt practices, at risk of significant 
situational obstacles and personal cost. However, the empirical 
research we discussed earlier, comparing whistleblowers and 
inactive observers, suggested that a variety of situational 
factors – such as the nature of an employee’s position 
– can help predict whether an individual will report unethical 
behaviour, and it seems plausible to regard casual status as 
another significant situational factor here. Thus, a permanent 
employee and a casual may both have strong altruistic 
dispositions, but their employment status can lead them to 
react quite differently to serious wrongdoing in their respective 
organisations – one will blow the whistle while the other will 
remain silent. Indeed, in considering much empirical research 
into whistleblowing, Terance Miethe (1999) says that:
contrary to claims that whistleblowers are more 
principled and ethical employees, there are no 
major differences between whistleblowers and non-
whistleblowers on these psychological beliefs… [This] 
suggests that whistleblowers cannot be adequately 
explained by reference to the personal characteristics 
themselves… we must look for other factors to account 
for the likelihood and type of whistleblowing (pp. 53-4).
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Given the role that situational factors can play in determining 
whether an employee observing unethical behaviour decides 
to report this, employees with sufficiently strong altruistic 
dispositions to go through with whistleblowing might be 
rarer than we perhaps like to think. But, contrary to what 
some philosophers suggest, this would not undermine the 
plausibility of taking steps to help employees develop more 
robust dispositions towards altruistic behaviour. It may, 
however, tell us that the task of getting people to act virtuously 
in a whistleblowing situation is harder than it may first appear. 
It also serves to emphasise the importance of removing various 
obstacles to altruistic behaviour. And it is natural to see this 
step as complementing rather than undermining attention to 
developing more robust dispositions to altruistic behaviour.
There is also a point about complicity which is worth 
emphasising here. Whistleblowers often say that not reporting 
the wrongdoing they observe in their organisation would lead 
them to feel (or be) complicit in this wrongdoing. However, being 
employed as a casual can perhaps make it psychologically 
easier to ‘wash one’s hands’ of one’s colleagues’ wrongdoing, 
because one feels less integrated into the organisation than 
do more senior employees (who generally seem somewhat 
less reluctant to blow the whistle). Casual employees may 
therefore be less likely than other employees to feel complicit 
in the wrongs perpetrated by their colleagues. In that 
case, casualisation would deter whistleblowing not only by 
increasing (or being perceived to increase) the personal risks 
involved, but also by reducing the likelihood that employees 
will feel complicit in organisational wrongdoing if they fail to 
blow the whistle. The complicity point also brings out how the 
factors determining such helping actions as whistleblowing 
can depend on a complex interplay of situational factors – such 
as the nature of the employment relationship and the level of 
organisational integration – and personal factors – such as 
the robustness of an individual’s altruistic dispositions and the 
strength of their sense of responsibility to the community. 
Another consequence of additional deterrents to whistleblowing 
is the potential loss of certain moral exemplars, and the effect 
of this loss on the community. The weight of situational factors 
is already heavily against those who are inclined to expose 
workplace corruption. Casualisation ‘ups the ante’ in the level 
of self-sacrifice necessary to prevent harms to the community, 
and so such acts of virtue as whistleblowing become even 
rarer in a more casualised workforce. (Presumably, situational 
factors could rise yet further and deter all but moral saints 
from whistleblowing.) This impoverishes us as a community, by 
concealing from us people who while perhaps not quite moral 
saints are nonetheless very virtuous (in that respect). Rothschild 
and Miethe (1999, p. 119) found that 79% of the 210 US 
whistleblowers they interviewed said it was their own ‘personal 
values’ – their sincere personal belief in the wrongness of the 
behavior observed – that motivated their reporting it (as distinct 
from reporting out of fear of being blamed for the wrongdoing 
themselves, or out of hostility to management). The actions of 
whistleblowers are not only reassuring and inspiring, but also 
strengthen community bonds. People who blow the whistle 
help others who are often strangers to them, commonly at 
great personal risk to themselves. Such disinterested altruism 
strengthens community ties, in a manner comparable to the 
case of altruistic blood donation (apart from the value of the 
blood given), which has been much-discussed by sociologists 
and economists (see eg. Titmuss 1970). (It can also have 
consequential benefits in inspiring others to whistleblow, as 
witnessing acts of altruism tends to foster further acts of 
altruism by others.) This strengthening of community ties is 
undermined by an unwillingness to whistleblow on observed 
corruption. Given that workplace corruption is a perennial 
problem, casualisation deprives us of acts of virtue that enrich 
us as a community: we are all the poorer, in various ways, if 
employees turn a blind eye to corruption.
What Measures Could be Taken to Address 
These Concerns?
If casualisation does undermine organisational accountability 
through deterring whistleblowing, what sorts of measures 
might be taken to address this problem? Our arguments might 
seem to support a complete abolition of casual positions, 
by legislating to ensure all employees were employed more 
securely. But while we would support moves to create more 
secure employment conditions for casual staff in many cases, 
we think it is neither realistic nor desirable to abolish casual 
positions altogether. For one thing, some individuals prefer 
casual to non-casual employment, because they plan to 
remain with a particular employer for only a short time, or 
they prefer to maintain some distance from the political issues 
in a given organisation. (For example, there is evidence that 
casual employment is not altogether unpopular in the nursing 
profession: see Underhill 2005)
In any case, some might question whether reversing 
casualisation is the most appropriate way of maintaining 
accountability. Taking steps to ensure anonymity for 
whistleblowers and doing more to protect them from possible 
retaliation may be regarded by some as more appropriate 
solutions. However, such measures have not proven to be 
very effective so far. Empirical studies of whistleblowers and 
individual case studies suggest that employers could do much 
more to protect the identities and welfare of whistleblowers 
in their organisations. Also, whistleblower legislation in 
Australia has unfortunately taken a long while to come about. 
What currently exists is some limited protection under the 
Public Services Act for federal government workers. The states 
and territories have led the way for the federal approach. 
South Australia was the first state to introduce whistleblower 
legislation in 1993. The Australian Capital Territory, 
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Queensland and New South Wales followed in 1994, and 
Victoria and Tasmania followed some years later. Northern 
Territory was the last territory to enact legislation while 
Western Australia has an Official Corruption Commission 
Act. Whistleblower legislation exists in the United Kingdom 
and New Zealand. James Rose explains that ‘Whistleblowers 
are not encouraged in Australia. There is no federal law’ 
(2004, p. 9). Yet despite legislation, whether at state or 
federal level, there are very few (if any) instances where the 
whistleblower has obtained any protection as a result of the 
existence of these laws. In 2002, the Senate Report began:
Whistleblowing or public interest disclosure schemes 
rest on the premise that individuals who make 
disclosures serve the public interest by assisting in 
the elimination of fraud, impropriety and waste. An 
effective whistleblower scheme is a necessary part of 
maintaining a good public administration framework 
(Commonwealth of Australia, p.1).
The rights of whistleblowers need to be better protected 
in the public arena, but particularly in the private arena 
– where corporate reputations are often held in high esteem 
by stakeholders. As Grace and Cohen explain, ‘In Australia at 
present there are no explicit protections for whistleblowers in 
the private sector’ (2005, p. 162). Lennane states, ‘…if you 
blow the whistle in the private sector, you’re out the door that 
day whereas, in the public sector, owing to various protections 
for a start, it may take them two or three years to get rid of you 
– which is not actually good healthwise’ (2000, p. 12). However 
an Australian Standard (AS8004) entitled ‘Whistleblower 
Protection Programs for Entities’, released in 2003, is designed 
to go some way towards protecting whistleblowers (Bowden 
2004, p. 4). 
Another measure worth considering is reducing incentives for 
employers to use casual labour in the first place. Multinational 
corporations are especially concerned about declining levels 
of public trust in them, and many have begun to look more 
carefully at their broader social and ethical responsibilities. As 
BHP Billiton states in their 2004 Guide to Business Conduct 
‘…we care about obtaining good results and equally how those 
good results are obtained’ (BHP Billiton 2004, 3). Multinational 
corporations may be shown how casualisation could be 
perceived by the community as undermining accountability. 
The ethics of an organisation may well be able to be evaluated 
by how it treats its genuine whistleblowers. Lennane argues, 
‘If you just use the whistleblowers as the indicator of how 
the organisation is, whistleblowers should be able to blow 
the whistle and be OK in their organisation, and, if they’re 
not, there’s something wrong’ (2000, p. 6). Further, while it 
is difficult to estimate the cost of fraudulent behaviour to the 
community, Sawyer recently estimated that the financial 
cost to Australians could be around $20 billion annually (Rose 
2004, p. 9) 
Conclusion
We have argued that casualisation is detrimental to the 
community in two important ways, neither of which have 
figured prominently in discussions of this employment trend. 
First, in deterring would-be whistleblowers, casualisation 
seems to undermine the accountability of organisations to 
the community. This is a loss to us all, not only to the casual 
employee themselves. By creating more jobs with insecure 
conditions, we make ourselves as a community less secure, by 
undermining the accountability of organisations to us. In other 
words, creating more precarious employment makes us all 
more precarious as a community. Second, in creating a further 
incentive for individuals to overlook workplace corruption, 
casualisation deprives the community of significant acts 
of virtue which enrich us all and strengthen community 
bonds. Gerald Vinten argues that the way a society treats its 
whistleblowers may be a measure for how ‘genuinely ethical 
and civilised’ that society is (1994, p. 19). Ironically, the brave 
and ethical who carefully weigh up their options and decide 
to ‘blow the whistle’ often find that they move from a secure 
employment position to a more precarious future.4 
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Notes
1 Of course, there may be – for various reasons – some 
precariousness about the positions of contract and continuing staff 
within an organisation, and conversely, casuals who are continually 
re-employed by the same organisation may not feel especially 
precarious in their positions; but casual staff,nonetheless,represent 
a key example of precarious employment.
2 A good example of this is the significant drop in public confidence 
in the UK medical profession and the National Health Service after 
the scandal concerning paediatric heart surgery at the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary in the 1990s. See the Bristol Inquiry (2001).
3 Including Ted Steele (University of Wollongong), Sydney Orr 
(University of Tasmania), Clyde Manwell (Adelaide University), 
Jeremy Evans (Australian National University), Frank Knopfelmacher 
(University of Melbourne), Michael Spautz (University of Newcastle), 
David Rindos (University of Western Australia), and Bruce Hall and 
Margaret Love (both from University of New South Wales), to name 
a few of the cases examined by Brian Martin and others.
4 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Monash 
University symposium Living Precariously: The struggle for social and 
economic citizenship, and at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and 
Public Ethics, Canberra. We thank the audiences on both occasions 
for their very useful comments. Special thanks are due to Claire 
Kelly, who provided invaluable research assistance for the paper, 
to Carla Lipsig-Mummé, for her feedback and encouragement, and 
to Steve Bolsin, Steve Clarke, Doug Gimesy, and Tom Faunce for 
helpful discussion of these and related issues.
